

從經濟激勵模型探討國防採購程序的研究

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【摘要】

國防採購過程具有極度隱密與不可監控的特質，同時執行過程中存在著不確定性、不能寫明與難以執行長期承包工程的現象。在壟斷與談判權力角力下，如何激勵廠商持續從事軍事產品研發，是政府重要國防產業政策之一。本研究發現藉由經濟激勵模型與角色模型探討國防採購相關議題，包括單一代工與多元代工採購過程時，經紀商與代理商間宜適應個別採購研發及不同階段軍品特質，採取不同的因應對策。

關鍵詞：經濟激勵模型、國防採購程序

【Abstract】

There're the natures of confidential and unmonitored in defense procurement, at the same time, the procedure indwelled uncertainly, unwritten and hardly long-time executed projects phenomenon. Between the monopolization and negotiation, the important incentive policy problem of government is how to encourage firm insisting R & D in the military product. This paper applied economic incentive model and actor model to examine the relative defense procurement question, including simple procurement process with a single agent, the single procurement process with multiple agents. Individual actor should face to the military procurement R& D, multiple characteristics of different military product, and then take the different and appropriate policy.

Keywords: Economic incentive model, defense procurement procedure